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STATUS REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT
David Stoelting*

On February 3, 1997, the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York issued a press release announcing strong support for the
creation of an international criminal court ("ICC"). A status
report, prepared by the Association's Committees on International
Law and International Human Rights,' amplified the Association's
position as favoring an independent and effective ICC which will be
free from political influence and fully cognizant of the rights
afforded accused persons and defendants. The complete text of the
2
Report, as issued in February 1997, follows.
The Association's strong endorsement of the ICC and concomitant Report was a milestone of sorts. The Association was the first
significant group of American lawyers to endorse the ICC since the
current round of negotiations began in 1995. 3 Moreover, many
groups clearly looked to lawyers for leadership on this issue, and
prior to the Association's endorsement, the lack of formal expres* Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, New York, NY; Secretary, Committee on International
Law, Association of the Bar of the City of New York 1995-1998; Vice Chair, Committee on
International Criminal Law, ABA Section of International Law and Practice; J.D. University
of Cincinnati Law School; LL.M. New York University School of Law.
I wish to express heartfelt gratitude to the convenors of the War Crimes and War Crimes
Tribunals Symposium, held at Hofstra University School of Law on September 18, 1997. In
particular, I would like to thank Professor Susan iefenbrun, the Symposium Director, and
Professor Peter Spiro, the Moderator of the panel entitled War Crimes Tribunals in the
Present in which I was privileged to participate. I also thank Michael Cardozo, former
President of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, and Professor Elizabeth F.
Defeis, former Chair of the Association's Committee on International Law.
1. David Stoelting was the principal author of the Report.
2. The Report initially appeared in 52 The Record of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York 79-122 (Jan.-Feb. 1997).
3. One year after the Report, in February 1998, the American Bar Association formally
endorsed the creation of an independent and effective ICC.
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sions of support from the organized bar for the ICC negotiations
was rather striking. The ICC represents, after all, the preeminent
issue of public international law in this decade, if not the century.
Can there be any issue more pertinent for comment by the organized bar than the question of how to create and operate an institution for applying established law?
Bar associations, though, are just one piece of the incredible
array of non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") that have nurtured, encouraged, and in many ways, shaped the structure and progress of the current diplomatic negotiations. Using tools such as the
Internet, the collective impact of the hundreds of NGOs that have
been clamoring for an ICC over the past decade has established a
new model for how international law is created and applied. This
process has truly been driven from the bottom up, with governments following and citizens leading.
The momentum behind the ICC was apparent throughout
1997, which has been a watershed year in the drive toward the creation of the ICC. Following the issuance of the Association's
Report, three sessions - in March, August and December, 1997 of the Preparatory Committee on the Creation of an International
Criminal Court ("PrepCom") took place at UN Headquarters in
New York. These sessions were truly extraordinary, as mid-level
diplomats from dozens of countries, seated in a cavernous room
with seats arranged in concentric semi-circles, expounded on the
jurisdiction, purpose and functions of the proposed international
criminal court. Most remarkable of all is that the debate was not
whether to create an ICC, but rather how it should be done.
In order to better focus on specialized issues, the three 1997
PrepComs divided into Working Groups. One Working Group
concentrated on the definition of war crimes. A major issue was
whether crimes committed in purely internal conflicts could be classified as "war crimes." Another important development was the
significant support for including gender crimes, as a separate category, such as rape and other crimes of sexual violence. Another
Working Group dealt with general principles of criminal law. These
principles included mens rea, actus rea, mistake of fact or law, command responsibility and statute of limitations.
The August 1997 PrepCom also divided into two Working
Groups. One Working Group dealt with complementarity and the
trigger mechanism. Another Working Group, concentrating on
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procedural matters, dealt with the commencement of prosecutions,
rights of suspects, and indictment procedures.
The December 1997 PrepCom featured a Working Group on
international cooperation and judicial assistance. These critical
issues addressed the obligations of states to cooperate with the ICC.
Should states have a duty to comply with requests for assistance
from the ICC, and which grounds for refusal would be legitimate, if
any? Another Working Group addressed penalties. The issues
included sentencing, aggravating or mitigating circumstances, punishment of minors, fines and reparations. The signal development
during the December 1997 PrepCom was the shift by the United
Kingdom away from a requirement that the Security Council
express approval prior to the initiation of cases.
The final PrepCom took place in March 1998, and the topics
discussed included the composition and administration of the ICC,
final clauses, relationship of the ICC with the UN, and a final
review of all provisions of the Draft Statute.
Despite the many years of preparatory groundwork, however,
the successful conclusion of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference on the International Criminal Court (the "Conference"), held
in Rome, Italy from June 15 - July 17, 1998, was by no means preordained. Fundamental issues remained as the Conference opened,
and as a result, the initial question seemed to be not what kind of
treaty would be produced, but rather whether the Conference
would produce a treaty at all.
In particular, a long-simmering rift quickly opened between
the steadfast position of the United States with respect to the divisive issues of the role of the Security Council and the independence
of the Prosecutor, and the position of the large and influential "likeminded" countries. The Conference essentially envisaged a Court
able to investigate alleged crimes independent of the Security
Council's imprimatur, upon the initiative of either a state party or
the Prosecutor. The United States, however, adhered to its longterm position that the Security Council's preeminent role under the
UN Charter in maintaining international peace and security dictated an ICC that functioned essentially at the behest of the Security Council. This negotiating posture from the world's only
superpower presented an apparent instance of an immovable force
meeting an irresistible object.
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By the final week, a showdown was unavoidable. Although
every delegation recognized the importance of United States support for the final ICC treaty, in the end, the position of the United
States simply did not attract support. For the United States, one of
only seven countries to vote against the final treaty, the approval by
the Conference of an ICC able to function to some extent
independent of the Security Council was an absolute deal-breaker.
The Conference negotiated to break through the stalemate, but
ultimately, the Conference recognized its own bottom-line position
which was approved by the 120 countries voting to adopt the treaty.
The Court will begin functioning once the treaty has been ratified
by sixty countries.
In closing, it would be appropriate to raise the possibility of
dashed expectations. Like all international instruments negotiated
in an intensely pressured environment, the ICC treaty is in many
respects flawed. The fundamental question, however, is whether
the ICC can truly be independent and effective. The indispensable
elements necessary for an effective ICC are, of course, no mystery.
There must be firm financial support, cooperation with investigations, prompt surrender of indictees to the Court, and an unequivocal commitment to fair and open trials that protect the rights of
defendants. Whether there will be the sustained political will that is
necessary to achieve these goals remains to be seen. Nevertheless,
the overwhelming adoption of an ICC treaty in the waning hours of
July 17, 1998 must be recognized as a signal achievement and a
landmark moment in international law.
REPORT ON THE PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
BY THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
COMMITrEE ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF

TH

BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw YORK

The Association of the Bar of the City of New York strongly
endorses the creation of a permanent international criminal court
to prosecute and punish individuals who commit the most serious
crimes under international law.4 The world's first permanent inter4. The Association of the Bar of the City of New York expressed support for the
establishment of an international criminal court in letters sent in February 1996 to President
Clinton and Senior government officials. See letters to William J. Clinton, Robert Dole,
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national criminal court ("ICC") would be the last major international institution created in this century, a time when the
inhumanity of armed conflict and internal atrocities has become
unconscionably familiar. Response to these recurring humanitarian
atrocities has been impeded by the fact that, as the Supreme Court
of Israel lamented in the Eichmann judgment, "there still does not
exist either an International Criminal Court or even international
penal machinery." 5 A proposal for a permanent tribunal is
attracting significant support, however, and assuming a continued
high level of commitment, the Court could be operational by late
1998.
"The most compelling reason for establishing an ICC is that
persons who commit the most serious crimes will otherwise go
unpunished[.]" 6 A permanent ICC will reduce the likelihood of
international crimes going unpunished while promoting the consistent application of international criminal norms. The ICC will not
diminish the authority or responsibility of national tribunals to punish international criminals,7 but in many cases national courts are
simply unable or unwilling to proceed. In these cases, when the
alternative is impunity for the perpetrators of international crimes,
the ICC would be authorized to exercise jurisdiction.
Permanency is required primarily because a permanent court is
likely to be more effective than ad hoc tribunals, which are inadequate in several respects. First, marshaling the necessary political
will and resources required to create ad hoc tribunals is notoriously
Newt Gingrich and Conrad K. Harper, from Barbara Paul Robinson, President of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York (February 26, 1996).
The American Bar Association and the New York State Bar Association also have
endorsed the establishment of an International Criminal Court. See ABA Section of
International Law and Practice, Report of the Task Force on an International Criminal Court
of the American Bar Association, 1 63 (1995); Working Groupon Improving the Effectiveness
of the United Nations, InternationalCriminal Court, 29 INT'L L. 300 (1995).
5. 36 I.L.R., 277, 292 (S.Ct. 1962) (attributing lack of international criminal court to
"present retarded stage of development").
6. Comments of the Government of the United States on Draft Articles for a Statute on
an International Criminal Court 10 (June 1, 1994).
7. In this respect the ICC statute differs from the Statute for the International Tribunal
for Yugoslavia, which in Article 9(2) proclaims the Tribunal's "primacy over national courts."
Report of the Secretary-Generalpursuant to paragraph2 of Security Council Resolution 808
(1993), U.N. Doc S/25704 (1993) (hereinafter "Secretary General's Yugoslavia Tribunal
Report"). The statute is contained in an Annex to the Secretary-General's Report
(hereinafter referred to as "Statute for the Yugoslavia Tribunal").
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difficult. Second, reliance solely on ad hoc tribunals or national
courts results in a system of international criminal enforcement that
appears idiosyncratic or selective. Why create tribunals in the cases
of Yugoslavia and Rwanda, for example, but not in other equally
compelling situations? In addition, the fundamental issue of
whether the Security Council's powers encompass the creation of
criminal tribunals persists. A permanent judicial institution is more
appropriately created by legislation, which in the case of the ICC
means a multilateral treaty.8 Finally, resolution-created judicial
bodies are innately temporal as Security Council resolutions can be
9
revoked or amended.
An independent ICC, which adheres to the highest standards
of fairness and due process, also is an important component of the
goal of achieving international peace and justice. For societies to
emerge from the trauma of prolonged armed conflict or internal
strife, a mechanism for justice is necessary to hold the perpetrators
of international crimes responsible and thereby promote stability.
In the absence of a forum for criminal accountability, the blame for
past atrocities may become a permanent barrier to national reconciliation and justice.
In addition, the drastically changed nature of international and
internal conflicts requires an institution capable of enforcing clearly
established law. During this century, warfare has evolved from conflicts where the principal victims are members of national armed
forces to conflicts where the majority of victims are innocent civilians. In many instances civilians have been the prime targets of
armed combatants, in clear violation of accepted norms of international criminal law. A minimal but essential response to the indiscriminate barbarity of modern warfare, therefore, should be a
permanent mechanism to enforce established international criminal
law.
A permanent ICC would also likely have a deterrent effect, a
crucial goal of any system of criminal law enforcement. The possibility of arrest, prosecution and punishment by a permanent inter-

8. James Crawford, The ILC Adopts a Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court,
89 AM. J. Irr'L L. 404, 416 (1995).
9. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session, 49
U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994) (hereinafter "Draft
Statute").
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national tribunal, especially in countries without effective judicial
institutions, should serve to deter future atrocities. The Court's
deterrent effect is also enhanced by the likelihood that the ICC, a
secondary forum available only if a national court is unavailable or
ineffective, will likely spur prosecutions by national tribunals for
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
Finally, the ICC merits support because the current proposal, a
Draft Statute' ° adopted in 1994 by the International Law Commission ("ILC"), 11 presents a realistic and workable basis for an effective court. The Draft Statute establishes an ICC by multilateral
treaty, open for ratification by interested states, that would prosecute only when national courts are unable or unwilling to proceed
and the violators would otherwise escape justice. 2 National tribunals will remain the preferred forum for prosecution of international crimes, and the right to seek extradition and other forms of
international judicial assistance will not be affected. The consensus
engendered by the Draft Statute is apparent in the nearly unanimous agreement reached in December 1996 to schedule a highand adopt a
level diplomatic conference for 1998 that will negotiate
3
treaty creating the international criminal court.'
I.

OUTLINE OF THE REPORT

This Report aims to increase awareness of, and support for, the
establishment of a permanent international criminal court. The
Report begins by explaining the present momentum in favor of the
ICC in terms of several factors: (1) a series of United Nations initia10. Id
11. The International Law Commission, whose thirty-four members are elected by the
General Assembly and serve in their individual capacity, is an advisory body of legal experts
established in 1947.
12. The proposed ICC's jurisdiction over natural persons should be distinguished from the
jursidiction of the International Court of Justice, ("IC") in the Hague, which has jurisdiction
only over states. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 34(1) ("Only states
may be parties in cases before the Court."). Created in 1945, the ICI is the principal judicial
organ of the United Nations, and all U.N. member states are automatically parties to the ICJ
Statute. See U.N. Charter, Art. 93(1).
13. G.A. Res. AIRES/51/207 (1996). Of the fifty-five countries that expressed a position
on the timing of the diplomatic conference during the October/November 1996 meetings of
the General Assembly's Sixth (Legal) Committee, only Algeria, China and Mexico did not
endorse the scheduling of the diplomatic conference in 1998. See NGO Coalition for an
International Criminal Court, Support For 1998 Diplomatic Conference (available on the
Internet at <http:J/wwwv.igc.apc.org/icc/1998conf.html>).
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tives and proposals; (2) the impact of previous international criminal tribunals; and (3) the continuing maturation of international
criminal law.
The next section describes the structure of the Court as set
forth in the draft ICC statute. The Report then examines several
prominent issues: (1) the ICC's subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the
procedures for initiating prosecutions; and (3) protection of the
rights of defendants and suspects. Finally, the Report discusses the
position of the United States and argues that support for the proposed ICC is entirely consistent with established legal principles
and policy of the United States. The Report concludes with the
following recommendations:
" The United States should work toward the prompt finalization
and ratification of the ICC treaty.
" The ICC's subject matter jurisdiction initially should be limited
to genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
" The Draft Statute's state consent requirements, which determine whether the ICC's jurisdiction may be exercised, may
unnecessarily inhibit the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction
and should be modified.
" The Prosecutor should be permitted to initiate investigations,
in addition to state parties and the Security Council.
" The Security Council's primary role in the maintenance of
international peace and security should not include the power
to block the initiation of cases within the ICC's jurisdiction.
• The protections afforded accused persons and defendants
under internationally recognized standards of fairness and due
process must be recognized and enforced by the ICC.
I.

PROLOGUE TO THE CREATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT

The international criminal court, although long considered
either unattainable or undesirable, 14 may well be established by the
14. See, e.g., Letter from Janet G. Muffins, Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs, to
Hon. Dan Quayle, President of the Senate, (October 2, 1991), (on file with Senate Comm. on

Foreign Relations, International Criminal Court, Senate Report No. 71, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.,
§ 3 (1993)) (hereinafter "Senate Report") (noting opposition or ambivalence of Canada,
Brazil, Austria, the Nordic countries, Mexico, Ghana and Australia on the need to create an
international criminal court).
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close of this century.' 5 The recent momentum in favor of the ICC
has largely been the result of three factors. First, a series of initiatives undertaken under United Nations auspices has supplied an
institutional context for ICC proposals. Second, prior ad hoc international criminal tribunals have demonstrated the feasibility of
criminal law enforcement through international tribunals. Finally,
international criminal law now provides a suitable basis for defining
the crimes within the ICC's subject matter jurisdiction.
A.

The United Nations and the ProposedICC

The United Nations has provided an institutional framework
for proposals and debates concerning international criminal law and
an international criminal court. The first initiatives, relating to the
codification of international criminal law, resulted from a 1947
General Assembly resolution requesting the International Law
Commission to prepare a "draft [c]ode of offenses against the peace
and security of mankind.' 1 6 The ILC continued to work on the

draft code of crimes, until finally, in July 1996, the International
Law Commission adopted the final text of twenty draft articles,
with commentaries, comprising the Draft Code of Crimes Against
the Peace and Security of Mankind.' 7
Shortly after work on the Draft Code of Crimes began in 1947,
the General Assembly passed a resolution recognizing that "there
will be an increasing need of an international judicial organ for the
15. See Proposed International Criminal Court Should Be Operational Before The Turn
of the Century, Preparatory Committee Told, U.N. Press Rel. LI2809 (1996) (describing
statements of representative of France). Adriaan Bos of The Netherlands, Chairman of the
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, stated in
April 1996 that "[last year at this time many countries, including several major powers, made
statements indicating their governments were not yet convinced of the need for an
International Criminal Court... This year none indicated they opposed the establishment of
an ICC. This fact is an indicator of the important progress achieved in a short period of
time." William Pace, Serious Progress Achieved at April ICC "Prep Corn", 1 THE INT'L
CRa. CT. MONrTOR 1 (July/Aug. 1996) (emphasis in original). See also Crawford, supra note
8, at 415 (noting "a distinct change in the balance of professional opinion. Most
international lawyers hitherto regarded a permanent criminal court as unrealistic and even
undesirable. Many now seem to have changed their minds.").
16. G.A. Res. 177 (II) (1947).
17. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session, 6
May-26 July 1996, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996)
(hereinafter "Draft Code of Crimes").
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trial of certain crimes under international law[.]"' 8 As a result, in
1950 the General Assembly created a "Committee on International
Criminal Jurisdiction" composed of representatives from seventeen
nations to "prepar[e] one or more preliminary draft conventions
and proposals relating to the establishment and the statute of an
international criminal court."'19
In 1951, the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction
completed a report and Draft Statute for an international criminal
court.2 ° The General Assembly then urged UN member states to
submit comments and suggestions, and requested the Committee to
prepare another report and Draft Statute exploring "the implications and consequences of establishing an international criminal
court and of the various methods by which this might be done."'"
The Committee submitted a revised Draft Statute in 1953.22
Further consideration of an international criminal court ceased
following the 1953 revised Draft Statute, primarily due to Cold War
politics and controversy over the proposed court's jurisdiction.
Academic specialistsz and nongovernmental organizations, 24 however, nurtured various proposals.
In 1989, Trinidad and Tobago, concerned with rampant narcotics trafficking in the Caribbean, raised the issue of an international
criminal court before the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the General
Assembly. Trinidad's initiative led to a request from the General
Assembly for the ILC, in the context of its ongoing work on the
Draft Code of Crimes, to consider "the question of establishing an
international criminal court or other international criminal trial
18. G.A. Res. 260 B (III) (1948).

19. G.A. Res. 489 (V) (1950). The Committee was composed of representatives of
Australia, Brazil, China, Cuba, Denmark, Egypt, France, India, Iran, Israel, the Netherlands,
Pakistan, Peru, Syria, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay. Id.
20. Report of the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction on its session held

from 1 to 31 August 1951, U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess., Supp. No. 11, U.N. Doc. A/2136 (1952).
21. G.A. Res. 687 (VII) (1952).

22. Report of the 1953 Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, 27 July-20
August 1953, U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 12, U.N. Doc. A/2645 (1954).
23. See M. CIrERiB BASSIOuNi, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE AND DIAIr
STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL (1987); BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, AN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, A STm, TowARD PEACE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY

Am ANALYSIS (1980).
24. Nongovernmental organizations play an active role in lobbying and disseminating
information. The NGO Coalition for an International Criminal Court's home page at <http://
www.igc.apc.org/icc> contains commentary, UN documents, and government position papers.
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mechanism[.]"''a The ILC subsequently established a working
group to develop a structure for an international criminal court.26
In November 1992, the General Assembly endorsed the efforts
of the ILC working group and requested it to continue drafting a
statute for an international criminal court In 1993, spurred in part
by the Security Council's decision to create an ad hoc tribunal to
prosecute atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia, the ILC
working group completed a Draft Statute and report, which the
ILC referred to the General Assembly. 21 The General Assembly
received the ILC's 1993 Draft Statute "with appreciation" and
requested the ILC to continue its work and formulate a final
draft. 9 Incorporating the extensive comments made by states in
the Sixth Committee, as well as by nongovernmental organizations,
the ILC significantly revised the earlier draft and in 1994 adopted a
Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court."
In December 1994 the General Assembly established an Ad
Hoc Committee to discuss the ILC's Draft Statute and identify revisions that would command broad political acceptance. The Ad Hoc
Committee met for two two-week sessions in 1995. At the conclusion of the Ad Hoc Committee's 1995 sessions, a consensus
emerged among participating states that although the Draft Statute
provided a suitable framework for discussion, further work was
needed.3'
In December 1995, the General Assembly adopted a resolution
creating the United Nations Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, open to all UN member states.32 The Preparatory Committee's overall mandate, wider
in scope than the ad hoc Committee's mandate, has been "to
prepar[e] a widely acceptable consolidated text of a convention for
25. G.A. Res. 44/39 (1989).
26. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-fourth session,
U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A147/10 (1992).
27. G.A. Res. 47/33 (1992).

28. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-fifth session, 45
U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 10 at 255, 335, U.N. Doc. A/48/10 (1993).
29. G.A. Res. 48/31 (1993).
30. Draft Statute, supra note 9.
31. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, 50 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 22, U.N. Doc. A/50/22 (1995).

32. See G.A. Res. 50/46 (1995).
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an international criminal court. '3 3 The draft convention that
emerges from the Preparatory Committee will be the basis for an
international diplomatic conference of "plenipotentiaries" to finalize and adopt the ICC statute.3 4 The Preparatory Committee
includes representatives from more than 120 countries, and met
from March 25-April 12 and from August 12-30, 1996, at UN Headquarters in New York.
The two Preparatory Committee sessions in 1996 made significant progress, as delegations and NGOs produced a significant
quantity of alternative texts, proposals and commentary.35 The
measure of the Committee's progress is the resolution adopted by
the Sixth Committee in November 1996. The resolution provides
that the diplomatic conference for "finalizing and adopting a con36
vention on the establishment of an international criminal court,"
will be held in 1998. The resolution also adopted the recommendation of the Preparatory Committee for an additional nine weeks of
37
Preparatory Committee sessions through April 1998.
The organization of the Preparatory Committee's remaining
sessions through April 1998 will be "in the form of open-ended
working groups, concentrating on the negotiation of proposals with
a view to producing a draft consolidated text of.a convention to be
submitted to the diplomatic conference. '38 The Preparatory Committee is directed to address a number of specific issues, including
definition and elements of crimes; principles of criminal law and
33. Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, Volume 1 (Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee during March-April
and August 1996), U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22, 6, U.N. Doc. A/51/22 (1996)
(hereinafter "Preparatory Committee Report").
34. A treaty, generally, is adopted at a diplomatic conference, and is then open for
signature for a certain period of time. A signature to a treaty does not bind a state in the
absence of endorsement by ratification. A state may also become a party to a treaty by
"accession," or, in the case of newly independent states, by "succession."
35. Volume II of the Preparatory Committee's Report contains the various proposals and
alternative texts submitted by states. Report of the Preparatory Committee on the

Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Volume II (Compilation of Proposals),
U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22A, U.N. Doc. A151/22 (1996) (hereinafter "Preparatory

Committee Compilation of Proposals").
36. U.N. Doc. AIC.6/51/L.10 (1996).
37. Id.; Preparatory Committee Report, supra note 33,

368(a). The Preparatory

Committee's 1997 meetings will be held February 11-21, August 4-15 and December 1-12.
The 1998 session will be from March 16-April 3.

38. U.N. Doc. A/C.6/51/L.10 (1996), supra note 36,
Committee Report).

368, (quoting Preparatory
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penalties; organization of the Court; complementarity and trigger
mechanism; cooperation with states; and finances.39
In December 1996, the General Assembly adopted the Sixth
Committee's resolution by consensus. Following the diplomatic
conference, which is scheduled to be held in Italy in late 1998, an
ICC treaty will enter into force upon ratification by a specified
number of states.4 °

B. Enforcement by InternationalCriminal Tribunals
The proposed international criminal court differs in important
respects from the tribunals created following World War II and in
response to the atrocities in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The ICC, for
example, will not be limited in scope to a specific situation or conflict, nor will it be created pursuant to Security Council resolutions,
as were the recent ad hoc tribunals. The proposed ICC, however,
should be regarded as an extension of the legal and structural
precedents established by the predecessor international criminal
tribunals, beginning with the landmark Nuremberg tribunal.4
The Allies created the Nuremberg Tribunal by the London
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War
Criminals of the European Axis. The tribunal's jurisdiction, established in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal annexed
to the London Agreement,42 encompassed crimes against peace,
which included aggression, war crimes, and crimes against human39. Id.
40. G.A. Res. A/RES/51/207 (1996).

Proposals ranged from twenty-five to ninety

28. The International
ratifications. Preparatory Committee Report, supra note 33,
Commission of Jurists, observing that international human rights treaties generally do not
require a large number of ratifications to enter into force, has suggested that twenty to
twenty-five ratifications would be reasonable. International Commission of Jurists, The
International Criminal Court: Third ICJ Position Paper, at 4-5 (Aug. 1995) (hereinafter "IC
Position Paper").
41. The Versailles Treaty following World War I provided for the constitution of an
international tribunal to prosecute the Kaiser and other alleged German war criminals.
Although the tribunal was not established, in Article 228 of the Versailles Treaty the German
government recognized the right of the Allies "to bring before military tribunals persons
accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war." The League
of Nations, in 1937, opened for signature a statute for an international criminal court, which
India was the only country to ratify.
42. Charter of the International Military Tribunal annexed to the Agreement for the
Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59
Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
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ity. The tribunal initially indicted twenty-four defendants and ultimately tried twenty-two of them, one in absentia, of whom nineteen
were convicted.4 3 The Nuremberg trials, of course, took place following a defeated enemy's unconditional surrender and therefore in
some respects are an inadequate precedent for a permanent court. 4
The ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda,
created by the UN Security Council in 1993 and 1994, are more
direct models for the permanent court in terms of structure and
jurisdiction. 5 In Yugoslavia, details of mass murders and concentration camps precipitated Security Council resolutions that
expressed concern over violations of international law in the region
and affirmed individual responsibility for such violations. 6 On
February 22, 1993, the Security Council decided to establish an
international tribunal to prosecute persons responsible for serious
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the former Yugoslavia since 1991. 47 The Secretary-General subsequently
issued a Draft Statute for the tribunal 48 and on May 25, 1993 the
Security Council formally established the Tribunal.4 9

The International Tribunal for Yugoslavia consists of three primary organs: a judiciary with eleven judges (assigned to two Trial
Chambers and an Appeals Chamber), the Prosecutor's Office, and
the Registry.50 The Tribunal's jurisdiction encompasses (1) grave
43. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East, established in Tokyo by
proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur, tried twenty-eight Japanese leaders, of whom

twenty-five were convicted.
44. Crawford, supra note 8, at 407.

45. The UN Charter gives the Security Council "primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security[. ]" U.N. Charter, art. 24(1). The Security
Council's powers in discharging its responsibility with respect to "any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression," are set forth in Chapter VII, and include the use of
force. U.N. Charter, art. 39.

46. S.C. Res. 827 (1993); S.C. Res. 764 (1992). On October 6, 1992, the Council created a
"Commission of Experts" to gather evidence relating to alleged violations of international

law. SC Res. 780 (1992). The Commission concluded in an interim report to the Security
Council that serious violations of international humanitarian law were occurring and
recommended the creation of an ad hoc international tribunal. See generally M. Cherif
Bassiouni, The United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 780 (1992), 88 AM. J. INT'L. L. 784 (1994).

47. S.C. Res. 808 (1993).
48. Statute for the Yugoslavia Tribunal, supra note 7.

49. S.C. Res. 827 (1993).
50. See Report of the InternationalTribunalfor the Prosecution of Persons Responsiblefor
Serious Violations on International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
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breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, (2) violations of the
laws or customs of war, (3) genocide and (4) crimes against humanity. As of late 1996, the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia had
indicted seventy-five persons, although only seven are in custody at
the Tribunal's seat in The Hague.
On May 7, 1996, the Tribunal commenced the trial of Dugko
Tadi6, the first defendant over whom it obtained custody. The trial
followed an unsuccessful motion by Tadi6 that alleged the unjustified primacy of the Tribunal over national courts and a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 5 1 The Appeals Chamber, in "a unique and
important event in the development of international law,"52 upheld
the lawfulness and subject matter jurisdiction of the Tribunal.53
The history of the International Tribunal for Rwanda is similar
to that of the Yugoslavia Tribunal. In the aftermath of the violence
that consumed Rwanda starting in April 1994, the Security Council
adopted a series of resolutions expressing alarm at violations of
international law and determining that the conflict represented a
threat to international peace and security.5 4 On November 8, 1994,
the Security Council, again acting under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, established the International Tribunal for Rwanda.55
The Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda gives the
Tribunal subject matter jurisdiction over: (1) genocide; (2) crimes
against humanity; and (3) violations of Article 3 common to the
Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. Doc. A/51/292, S/1996/665 (1996) (hereinafter "Third

Report of the Yugoslavia Tribunal").
51. Prosecutor v. Tadid, No. IT-94-1-T (Yugo. Tribunal Trial Chamber, Aug. 10, 1995),
affd, No. IT-94-1-AR72 (Yugo. Tribunal, Appeals Chamber, Oct. 2, 1995), reprinted in 35
I.L.M. 32 (1996).
52. Third Report of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, supra note 50, 33.
53. Prosecutor v. Tadi6, supra note 51. The Tadi6 trial, in which 115 witnesses gave

testimony, took seven months and ended on November 28,1996. The Tribunal's next trial, of
four Muslims accused of committing atrocities at a detention camp in Bosnia, is scheduled to
begin in late 1997.
54. In July 1994, the Security Council authorized the creation of a Commission of Experts
to examine the evidence. The Commission's December 1994 report concluded that Hutu
forces had committed genocide against the Tutsi minority. S.C. Res. 918 (1994); S.C. Res. 935
(1994). The Secretary-General's report concluded that "[o]n the basis of the evidence that

has emerged, there can be little doubt that [the situation in Rwanda) constitutes
genocide.... ." Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Rwanda, U.N. Doc. S1

1994/640 (1994).
55. The Statute for the International Tribunal for Rwanda is contained in an Annex to SC

Res. 955 (1994) (hereinafter "Statute for the Rwanda Tribunal").
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Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol 1H.56 The Rwanda
Tribunal has handed down twenty-four indictments, with thirteen
persons in detention.
The International Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda function under considerable impediments. Funding shortfalls and inadequate staffing, among other problems, have complicated their
operations.5 7 The most serious setback, and one that jeopardizes
the ultimate success of the Tribunals, has been the failure to apprehend persons indicted of crimes.58 These operational difficulties,
however, should not obscure the importance of the establishment
and operation of the first international criminal tribunals since
Nuremberg. The process of creating the ad hoc tribunals, which
coincided with the ILC deliberations on the permanent court, represented a conceptual breakthrough which energized the pace of
the ICC initiative. 9 Moreover, as the next section describes, developments regarding the scope and content of international criminal
law have been equally important.
C. The Progress of InternationalCriminal Law
The international criminal court will not command respect or
legitimacy if the conduct it seeks to prosecute and punish is not
universally considered criminal, or if the ICC is viewed as legislating or creating law rather than applying existing law. The subject
matter jurisdiction of the proposed ICC, therefore, is appropriately
limited to clearly established crimes under customary international
law that are, as the Preamble to the Draft Statute states, "the most
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a
whole."6
The core of the proposed ICC's jurisdiction is over certain
crimes under "general international law,"'" also referred to as cus56. See infra text accompanying notes 65-73, 127; 131 (discussing Geneva Conventions
and Protocols).

57. See, e-g., Cedric Thornberry, Saving the War Crimes Tribunal, 104 FOREIGN POLICY 72
(1996).
58. The Yugoslavia Tribunal recently reported, in a significant understatement, that the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Republika Srpska "have failed fully to cooperate by

arresting and surrendering to the Tribunal persons indicted of war crimes, crimes against
humanity and genocide." Third Report of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, supra note 50, at 8.

59. See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 8, at 405-06.
60. Draft Statute, supra note 9, Preamble.

61. International Law Commission Commentary, supra note 11, art. 20.
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tomary international law. Customary international law is considered binding law and results from a general and consistent practice
adhered to by states from a sense of legal obligation.6" It is based
on consistent state practice and opinio juris. Ratification of multilateral treaties, independent of the rights and obligations estab-

lished among the parties, also constitutes evidence of customary
international law. A treaty also may have the effect of codifying or

developing customary international law,63 and multilateral treaties
have significantly affected the development of international crimes
under customary international law.

The customary international law that the ICC will apply is generally "defined by existing treaties."' These treaties include the
Genocide Convention, "Geneva law," "Hague law," and the
Nuremberg Charter.
The 1948 Genocide Convention,65 without dispute a part of
customary international law, forms a central component of the
court's subject matter jurisdiction. The Genocide Convention,
which entered into force in January 1951, has been ratified by 122
countries, including by the United States on February 23, 1989.66
Article IV of the Convention provides that persons committing acts
of genocide "shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally
responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals."
The International Court of Justice underscored the universality
of the Genocide Convention by holding, in the Bosnia v. Yugoslavia
case, that "the rights and obligations enshrined by the Convention
are rights and obligations erga omnes. [T]he obligation each State
thus has to prevent and to punish the crime of genocide is not territorially limited[.]" 67
62. RES=ATEMENT (THmD) OF T=E FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(2)(1987); See also Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714-17
(9th Cir. 1992) (discussing nature of customary international law and concluding that "the
right to be free from official torture is fundamental and universal, a right deserving of the
highest status under international law").
63. See lId § 102, Comment f ("Multilateral agreements open to all states, however, are
increasingly used for... codifying and developing customary law").
64. International Law Commission Commentary, supra note 11, Part 3.
65. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 227.
66. See 18 U.S.C. § 1091.
67. Case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), 1996 I.C.J.
31 (July 11)
(Judgment) (unofficial text released by ICJ Registry).
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"Geneva law" consists of the four Geneva Conventions6 8 and
Protocols6 9 established under the aegis of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) dealing primarily with the protection of victims. The Geneva Conventions have been ratified by 185
countries, including by the United States in 1956. Article 3 common to all four Conventions establishes minimum rules to be
observed in internal armed conflicts, 70 and "binds parties to internal conflicts regardless of whether
they are recognized nations or
71
roving hordes of insurgents."
Each Geneva Convention, as well as Protocol I, identifies particular acts described as "grave breaches, '72 and requires state parties to enact legislation establishing criminal penalties for "grave
68. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (hereinafter
"Geneva Convention I"); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (hereinafter "Geneva Convention II"); Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135
(hereinafter "Geneva Convention III"); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (hereinafter
"Geneva Convention IV").
69. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
(hereinafter "Protocol I"); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (hereinafter "Protocol II"). Protocol I has been ratified by 143
countries, and Protocol II has been ratified by 134 countries. The United States signed both
Protocols, but has ratified neither. See generally Theodor Meron, The Time Has Come For
The United States To Ratify Geneva Protocol1,88 AM. J. INr'L L. 678 (1994).
70. Article III common to all four Geneva Conventions states that: "the following acts are
and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the
above-mentioned persons: (a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b) taking of hostages; (c) outrages upon personal
dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; (d) the passing of sentences and
the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly
constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable
by civilized peoples." Conventions I, II, III & IV, supra note 68, art. 3 (hereinafter
"Common Article 1II").
71. Kadic v. Karadi6, 70 F.3d 232, 243 (2d Cir. 1995), reh'gdenied, 74 F.3d 377 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 2524 (1996).
72. For example, Geneva Convention I states that "Grave breaches to which [state parties
are obligated to enact penal sanctions for] ... shall be those involving any of the following
acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the Convention: willful killing,
torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great
suffering or serious injury to body or health, and extensive destruction and appropriation of
property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly."
Geneva Convention I, supra note 68, art. 50. See also Geneva Convention II, supra note 68,
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breaches."'7 3 The United States, as a party to the Geneva Conventions, recently carried out its obligation to criminalize grave
breaches of the Conventions by passing the War Crimes Act of
1996. 74
"Hague law" is based on the 1907 Hague Convention 7 dealing
principally with the laws of war. Forty-three countries have ratified
the Hague Convention, including the United States in 1909. The
concept of "war crimes" initially derived from Hague law but more
recently is regarded as somewhat coterminous with Geneva law.
The ICI's Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion summarized the consolidation of Hague law and Geneva law:
A large number of customary rules have been developed by the
practice of States and are an integral part of international law[.]
[The] "Hague Law" and, more particularly, the Regulations
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, fixed the
rights and duties of belligerents in their conduct of operations[.]
One should add to this the "Geneva Law" (the Conventions of
1864, 1906, 1929 and 1949), which protects the victims of war and
aims to provide safeguards for disabled armed forces personnel
and persons not taking part in the hostilities. These two branches
of the law applicable in armed conflict have become so closely
interrelatedthat they are considered to have graduallyformed one
single complex system, known today as internationalhumanitarian
law.
It is undoubtedly because a great many rules of humanitarian law
applicable in armed conflict are so fundamental to the respect of
the human person and "elementary considerations of humanity"
that the Hague and Geneva Conventions have enjoyed a broad
accession. Further these fundamental rules are to be observed by
all States whether or not they have ratified the conventions that
contain them, because they constitute
intransgressible principles
76
on international customary law.
art. 51; Geneva Convention III, supra note 68, art. 130; Geneva Convention IV, supra note
68, art. 147; Protocol I, supra note 69, art. 85(3), (4).
73. Geneva Convention I, supra note 68, art. 49; Geneva Convention II, supra note 68,
art. 50; Geneva Convention HI, supra note 68, art. 129; Geneva Convention IV, supra note
68, art. 146; Protocol I, supra note 69, arts. 85, 86.
74. War Crimes Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-192, 110 Stat. 2104 (Aug. 21, 1996).
75. Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with
Annex of Regulations, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. 539.
76. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J.
75, 79 (July 8)
(unofficial text released by ICJ Registry) (emphasis added).
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The Genocide Convention, Geneva law, Hague law, and the
Nuremberg Charter are collectively described in the SecretaryGeneral's Report on the Statute for the International Tribunal for
Yugoslavia as "beyond any doubt part of customary [international]
law so that the problem of adherence of some but not all States to
specific conventions does not arise. '77 Furthermore, the application of these universally applicable standards as a benchmark of
individual criminal liability was established fifty years ago in the
Nuremberg Judgment:
That international law imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals as well as upon States has long been recognized.
[I]ndividuals can be punished for violations of international law.
Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by
abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit
such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.78
State practice also confirms individual criminal responsibility
for violations of international criminal law. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, for example, recently held
that "certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations whether
undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as
private individuals. 7 9 In addition, many nations, in military manuals or in legislation, have criminalized and prosecuted in national
courts serious breaches of the rules and principles of international
humanitarian law.8°
International criminal law, as customary international law, is
applicable to individuals. No permanent international institution,
77. Secretary-General's Yugoslavia Tribunal Report, supra note 7, 35.
78. InternationalMilitary Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, Oct. 1, 1946,
reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 220-21 (1947).
79. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243 (recognizing "the settled proposition that federal common law
incorporates international law" and that acts of genocide, war crimes, and torture by
individuals are violations of international law).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Calley, 22 C.M.A. 534 (U.S.C. M.A. 1973) (affirming

conviction of United States soldier for summary executions of unresisting persons); see also
Prosecutor v. Tadid, supra note 51,
130-33; Theodor Meron, InternationalCriminalization
of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. NT'L L. 554, 586-87 (1995). Many countries, moreover,
including the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, have enacted legislation
regarding cooperation with various aspects of the International Tribunals for Yugoslavia and
Rwanda. Russia, among other states, has formally stated that no legislation is necessary to
ensure full compliance. Third Report of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, supra note 50, I 181-85.
See also Amnesty International, International Criminal Tribunals: Handbook for
Government Cooperation, AI Index: IOR 40/07196 (Aug. 1996).
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however, provides an enforcement mechanism; therefore, when
nations are unable or unwilling to prosecute under their criminal or
military codes, impunity for even the most blatant and egregious
offenders results. The ICC fills this institutional lacuna.
III. Tim ILC's 1994 DRAFr

STATUTE

This section describes the basic structure of the proposed ICC
as set forth in the International Law Commission's 1994 Draft Statute, which has provided the framework for negotiations within the
ad hoc Committee and the more recent Preparatory Committee.
Virtually every section of the Draft Statute underwent significant scrutiny at the 1996 Preparatory Committee sessions. Governmental delegations proposed alternative versions of many articles
as well as the deletion of certain articles.8 ' The various competing
proposals will be subject to further debate and revision before the
final treaty text is drafted at the diplomatic conference, scheduled
for late 1998. As a starting point, though, an understanding of the
Draft Statute's structure and procedures is essential.
1. Structure of the proposed ICC
The Draft Statute describes an ICC with four principal organs:
(1) a Presidency, (2) Trial Chamber(s) and an Appeals Chamber,
(3) a Procuracy and (4) a Registry. 2
The Presidency, consisting of a President and first and second
Vice Presidents, is elected from among the judges of the ICC by a
majority of judges. The eighteen judges of the ICC are elected to
single nine-year terms by a majority vote of state parties. No two
judges shall be from the same state, and the judges selected should
"represent[ ] the principal legal systems of the world."83 Judges of
the ICC should be "persons of high moral character, impartiality
and integrity who possess the qualifications required in their
81. See Preparatory Committee Report, supra note 33,

13 (listing sixty written proposals

submitted by UN member states during the Preparatory Committee's August 1996 session);
Preparatory Committee Compilation of Proposals, supra note 35.

82. Draft Statute, supra note 9, art. 5. France has proposed additional organs: a
"Preliminary Investigations Chamber"; a "Remand Chamber"; a "General Assembly of
Judges"; and a "General Assembly of States Parties." Draft Statute for an International
Criminal Court Working Paper Submitted By France, U.N. Doc. A/AC.2491L.3 (1996)
(hereinafter "Working Paper Submitted By France").

83. Draft Statute, supra note 9, art. 6.
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respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial
offices."' In addition, judges must have both "criminal trial experience" and "recognized competence in international law."
The judges, according to the Draft Statute, "shall be independent."85 Any activity which might "interfere with their judicial functions" or "affect confidence in their independence" is prohibited.
Judges of the ICC are prohibited from holding any legislative, executive or prosecutorial positions in a national government.8 6
The Presidency performs a number of pre- and post-trial procedural and administrative functions. Among these functions is the
appointment of the Appeals Chamber from among the judges of
the ICC for renewable three-year terms.' The Appeals Chamber
consists of the President and six other judges. The Presidency also
has the responsibility of nominating five judges to be members of
the Trial Chamber for a given case.88
The Procuracy, headed by the Prosecutor and assisted by Deputy Prosecutors, is an independent organ responsible for the investigation of complaints and the conduct of prosecutions. The
Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutors, who hold office for renewable
five-year terms, are nominated by state parties and elected by a
majority of the state parties.89 They must be "persons of high moral
character and have high competence and experience in the prosecution of criminal cases." 90
The Registrar and Deputy Registrar, elected by a majority of
the judges, are the principal administrative officers of the ICC. 91
The Draft Statute delineates a number of functions for the Registrar relating primarily to its role as a depository of notifications and
as a channel for communications with states.
2. Pre-trial procedures
An investigation by the Procuracy is initiated either (1) by a
state party "lodg[ing] a complaint with the Prosecutor alleging that
84. I& at art. 6(1).
85. Id. at art. 10(1).
86. Id. at art. 10(2).

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

art. 9(1).
art. 9(5).
art. 12(3).
art. 12(3).
art. 13.
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a crime appears to have been committed" or (2) by the "referral
of a matter to the Court by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations." 93 The Draft Statute
does not permit the Prosecutor to sua sponte initiate a complaint or
investigation.
Upon receipt of a complaint from a state or a referral by the
Security Council, the Prosecutor may commence an investigation
unless the Prosecutor, on an initial review of the complaint and supporting documentation, "concludes that there is no possible basis
for a prosecution."94 The Prosecutor's investigation may involve
on-site questioning of witnesses or suspects, collecting evidence,
and seeking the cooperation of states. The Prosecutor then must
determine whether a prima facie case exists, defined in the ILC's
commentary to the Draft Statute as "a credible case which would (if
not contradicted by the defense) be a sufficient basis to convict the
accused of the charge."95
The Prosecutor's investigation should also determine whether
the case is "inadmissible" because the crime in question: (1) has
been investigated by a state with jurisdiction and made a wellfounded decision not to proceed; (2) is under investigation by a
state that may have jurisdiction; or (3) is not of such gravity to justify further action by the Court.95 Issues of admissibility also may
be raised before the commencement of the trial by an accused or by
an "interested state." After the commencement of the trial, admissibility issues may be raised only on the Court's own motion.
If a prima facie case exists, and the case is admissible, the Prosecutor prepares an indictment stating concisely the facts alleged
and the crimes alleged to have been committed. The Prosecutor
also must inform the Presidency if it determines that there are
insufficient grounds to file an indictment.9 7 A decision not to proceed may be reviewed by the Presidency, at the request of the complainant state or the Security Council, after which the Presidency
"may request the Prosecutor to reconsider the decision. ' 98 Ulti92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at art. 25.
Id. at art 23(1).
Id- at art. 26(1).
International Law Commission Commentary, supra note 11, art. 34.
Draft Statute, supra note 9, art. 35.
Id. at art. 26(4).
Id at art. 26(5).
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mate discretion on whether to file an indictment remains with the
Prosecutor.
The indictment is filed with the Registrar and thereafter submitted to the Presidency. The Presidency is required to "examine
the indictment and any supporting material" to determine whether
a prima facie case indeed exists regarding a crime within the
Court's jurisdiction. If the Presidency determines that a prima facie
case exists, and also that the case is admissible pursuant to the criteria in Article 35, the Presidency is required to "confirm the
indictment." 99
The Presidency must at the confirmation stage also assess, like
the Prosecutor, whether the case is "admissible."'0 0 Assuming a
case is admissible, the ICC is also required to satisfy itself, even in
the absence of a challenge, that it has jurisdiction. 1 1 The accused
and "any interested State" are permitted to challenge the jurisdiction of the ICC in the Trial Chamber after confirmation of the
indictment.' 02 A defendant is also permitted to challenge jurisdiction "at any stage of the trial."'" 3
Whether the ICC may exercise jurisdiction over a person
depends on the crime alleged and whether certain states have
accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC over the crime alleged. The
jurisdictional state consent requirements are examined in greater
detail infra Part V.A.
After the commencement of the Prosecutor's investigation, the
Presidency may at the Prosecutor's request issue a warrant for the
"provisional arrest" of a suspect if there are sufficient grounds and
if the suspect "may not be available to stand trial unless provisionally arrested."'0 4 A suspect provisionally arrested must be released
if the indictment is not confirmed within ninety days of the provisional arrest, although the ninety day period may be extended by
the Presidency.

99. Il at art. 27(2).
100. IK at art. 27(2).
101. l& at art. 24.
102. Id. at art. 34.
103. Id, at art. 34(b). At all hearings relating to admissibility and jurisdiction, "the accused
and the complainant State have the right to be heard." Id. art. 36(1).
104. Draft Statute, supra note 9, art. 28(1)(b).
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3. Trial
Following confirmation of the indictment, the Presidency convenes a Trial Chamber of five judges. The Presidency also may
issue orders relating to the language(s) to be used at trial, the arrest
and transfer of the accused, the exchange of information between
the Prosecutor and the defense, and provision for the protection 10of5
the accused, victims, witnesses, and of confidential information.
The Draft Statute also provides that the rules of procedure and evidence should be drawn up by the judges of the ICC within six
and then submitted to a conference
months of the judicial elections
10 6
of state parties for approval.
The Trial Chamber has a range of powers necessary for conducting the trial, including the power to require the attendance and
testimony of witnesses and the production of evidence. In addition,
the Trial Chamber is charged with ensuring "full respect for the
rights of the accused and due regard for the protection of victims
and witnesses."'1 7 The rights of the accused, which include the presumption of innocence, 10 8 reflect the fundamental rights set forth in
Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.'0 9 At least three of five Trial Chamber judges must concur
in any conviction, acquittal, or sentencing. Upon conviction, the
may order a fine or imprisonment, but not the death
Trial Chamber
110
penalty.
The Draft Statute states that "the accused should be present
during the trial.""' The Trial Chamber is authorized, however, to
conduct trials in absentiafor reasons "of security or the ill-health of
the accused," if the accused continuously disrupts the trial, has
105. Id. at arts. 26-28.
106. Il- at art. 19. Significant support exists, however, for establishing the rules of
procedure and evidence in conjunction with the diplomatic conference.
107. Id. at art. 38(2). Article 43 authorizes the Court to take "necessary measures" to
protect defendants, victims and witnesses, including conducting "closed proceedings" or
presenting evidence by "electronic or other special means."
108. Id. at art. 40.
109. Draft Statute, supra note 9, art. 41; International Law Commission Commentary,
supra note 10, art. 41. See infra Part VI for further discussion of protection of the rights of
defendants.
110. Draft Statute, supra note 9, arts. 45-47, 53. Article 47 stipulates which state's laws the
Trial Chamber is to have reference to in determining penalties.
111. Id. at art. 37(1).
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escaped, or has broken bail." 2 If "a trial cannot be held because of
the deliberate absence of an accused," the Trial Chamber may create an Indictment Chamber to record the evidence and consider
whether such evidence constitutes a prima facie case. If a prima
facie case is established, the Indictment Chamber then issues an
arrest warrant. 113 Finally, "the record of evidence before the
Indictment Chamber shall be admissible.""' 4
4. Appeal
Both the Prosecutor and convicted persons have a right of
appeal following a judgment of the Trial Chamber. Grounds for
appeal include procedural error, error of fact or law, or disproportion between the crime and sentence. 1 5 The Appeals Chamber, if itfinds that the proceedings below were "unfair" or the decision was
"vitiated by error of fact or law,""' 6 may reverse or amend the Trial
Chamber's decision, or order a new trial. On the Prosecutor's
appeal following an acquittal, the Appeals Chamber may order a
new trial. The Chamber may also amend a sentence if it finds the
sentence "manifestly disproportionate to the crime. 11 7 A trial or
appeal may also be reconvened if, upon motion by a convicted person or the Prosecutor, newly discovered evidence appears which
"could have been a decisive factor in the conviction." 118
The Court's judgments are legally binding on all parties to the
statute. Persons convicted serve sentences of imprisonment, under
the ICC's supervision, in a state designated by the ICC from a list of
willing states, or if no state is so designated, in the host state of the
112. Id. at art. 37(2).
113. Id. at art. 37(4). The Indictment Chamber is modeled on the rule 61 hearings

provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Yugoslavia Tribunal. In JuneJuly 1996, a Trial Chamber of the Yugoslavia Tribunal held rule 61 proceedings on the

indictments against KaradEi6 and Mladic. The proceedings resulted in international arrest
warrants for Karadi6 and Mladic, and "certification" that the failure to apprehend Karadii6
and Mladic was due to the refusal of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republika
Srpska to cooperate with the Tribunal. Third Report of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, supra note
50, 61.
114. Draft Statute, supra note 9, art. 37(5)(a).
115. Id at art. 48(1).
116. Id. at art. 49(2).
117. Id. at art. 49(3).
118. Id. at art. 50(1).
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ICC. Subject to certain procedures and conditions, convicts would
be eligible for pardon, parole, and commutation of sentences. 119
E.

Cooperationwith states and judicial assistance

The Draft Statute requires state parties to "cooperate with the
Court in connection with criminal investigations and proceedings. ' Cooperation may take the form of locating persons, taking
testimony, producing evidence or serving papers.1 21 Requests to
states to cooperate or provide judicial assistance are transmitted by
the Registrar. The Court also may request a state to take provisional measures, such as preventing an accused from leaving its territory or provisionally arresting a suspect.
Provisions relating to the transfer of an accused to the Court
are set forth in Article 53. In this regard the Draft Statute's distinction between genocide, as the crime that invokes the Court's
"inherent jurisdiction," and other crimes, is relevant. In the case of
genocide, all state parties are required to "take immediate steps to
arrest and transfer the accused to the Court" upon receipt of a
request from the Registrar. 22 In cases other then genocide, an
obligation to transfer only adheres if the state party has accepted
the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the crime in question."z A state party which has not accepted the Court's jurisdiction with respect to the crime in question that receives a request has
three options: (1) "in accordance with its legal procedures, take
steps to arrest and transfer the accused to the Court," (2) "extradite
the accused to a requesting State" or (3) "refer the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution."' 24
IV.

CRIMES WITHIN T=E SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF

THE ICC

The ICC's subject matter jurisdiction, as set forth in the Draft
Statute, encompasses: (1) genocide, (2) aggression, (3) serious vio119. Id. at arts. 58-60.
120. Id. at art. 51(1).
121. Draft Statute, supra note 9, art. 51; International Law Commission Commentary,
supra note 11, art. 51.
122. Draft Statute, supra note 9, art. 51(2)(a)(i).
123. Id. at art. 51(2)(a)(ii).
124. Id. at art. 53(2)(c).
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lations of the law and customs applicable in armed conflict (or war
crimes), (4) crimes against humanity and (5) certain crimes established pursuant to multilateral treaties.12- This section examines
the subject matter jurisdiction of the proposed ICC, and concludes
125. Id. at art. 20. The Annex to the Draft Statute fists the treaties which would be a part
of the ICC's subject matter jurisdiction. The treaties listed in the Annex are:
1. Grave breaches of:
(i) the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 12 August 1949, as
defined by Article 50 of that Convention;
(ii) the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of 12
August 1949, as defined by Article 51 of that Convention;
(iii) the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12
August 1949, as defined by Article 130 of that Convention;
(iv) the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Tme of War of 12 August 1949, as defined by Article 147 of that
Convention;
(v) Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts of 8
June 1977, as defined by Article 85 of that Protocol.
2. The unlawful seizure of aircraft as defined by Article 1 of that Hague Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft of 16 December 1970.
3. The crimes defined by Article 1 of the Montreal Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation of 23 September 1971.
4. Apartheid and related crimes as defined by Article II of the International
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid of 30
November 1973.
5. The crimes defined by Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including
Diplomatic Agents of 14 December 1973.
6. Hostage-taking and related crimes as defined by Article 1 of the International
Convention against the Taking of Hostages of 17 December 1979.
7. The crime of torture made punishable pursuant to Article 4 of the Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment of 10 December 1984.
8. The crimes defined by Article 3 of the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation of 10 March 1988 and
by Article 2 of the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf of 10 March 1988.
9. Crimes involving illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances as
envisaged by Article 3 (1) of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 20 December 1988 which,
having regard to Article 2 of the convention, are crimes with an international
dimension.
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that the ICC's initial jurisdiction should be limited to the "core
crimes" -

1 26
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Genocide

A.

The ICC without question will have jurisdiction over the crime
of genocide. There has been further consensus that Articles II and
III of the widely ratified Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 127 provide an authoritative
definition of the crime of genocide. The Statute for the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia incorporates the Genocide Convention's definition as well.' Finally genocide is clearly punishable by
the ICC as the Genocide Convention, in Article VI, provides for
trial "by such
jurisdiction."' 12 9

international

penal

tribunal

as may

have'

126. The Draft Statute fails to enumerate the specific elements of these crimes, or defenses,
although the statutes for the International Tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia do list
specific proscribed conduct. There was universal agreement at the Preparatory Committee,
though, that "all general elements of crimes and the basic principles of liability and defense

should be elaborated by States and laid down in the Statute itself, or in an annex thereto
which would have the same legal value as the Statute." Preparatory Committee Report,
supra note 33, 180. Article 39 of the Draft Statute expresses this principle in terms of the
maxim nullum crimen sine lege, or no crime without law.
127. See Genocide Convention, supra note 65, arts. II, III.
Articles II and ImI of the Genocide Convention provide:
Article II
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about
its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Article III
The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide.
128. Statute for the Yugoslavia Tribunal, supra note 7, art. 4.
129. Genocide Convention, supra note 65, art. VI.
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Serious Violations of the Laws and Customs Applicable in
Armed Conflict

War crimes, referred to in the Draft Statute as "serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflict," are also
appropriately within the ICC's subject matter jurisdiction. The ILC
Commentary notes that the category of war crimes "overlaps but is
not identical to the category of grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocol I of 1977. " 13° The grave
breaches provisions of the Geneva Conventions clearly envision
individual criminal responsibility in that state parties are required
to enact legislation "necessary to provide effective penal sanctions
for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the
grave breaches"'' of the Conventions. An additional source is the
1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War, which provides the basis for the war crimes definitions found
in the Nuremberg Charter, and "has become part of the body of
1 32
international customary law."'
A principal definitional issue with respect to war crimes is
whether this category applies to internal, as opposed to international, armed conflicts. Some states argued in the Preparatory
Committee that violations of the laws and customs of war committed in purely internal conflicts should be excluded from the ICC's
jurisdiction. Other states argued that violations committed in internal armed conflicts should be included because, among other reasons, national courts are less likely to address such offenses. 3 3
Our position is that customary international law provides for
individual criminal responsibility for war crimes committed in
purely internal conflicts. The Statute for the Rwanda Tribunal and
the Draft Code of Crimes 34 both apply the laws of war to purely
internal conflicts. In addition, the Appeals Chamber for the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia in the Tadid decision found that
"customary international law imposes criminal liability for serious
130. International Law Commission Commentary, supra note 11, art. 20.
131. Geneva Convention I, supra note 68, art. 49; Geneva Convention II, supra note 68,
art. 50; Geneva Convention HI, supra note 68, art. 129; Geneva Convention IV, supra note
68, art. 146. See also Protocol I, supra note 69, art. 80.
132. Secretary-General's Yugoslavia Tribunal Report, supra note 7, IT 41-42.
133. Preparatory Committee Report, supra note 33, 78.
134. Draft Code of Crimes, supra note 17, art. 20(f).
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violations of common Article 3 [of the 1949 Geneva Conventions],
as supplemented by other general principles and rules on the protection of victims of internal armed conflict, and for breaching cerand rules regarding means and methods
tain fundamental principles
135
strife.'
civil
in
of combat
The State Department and by the Defense Department also
advocate applying war crimes prohibitions to internal armed conflicts, as shown in letters submitted to Congress during deliberations on the War Crimes Act of 1996:
[T]he phrase "war crimes" should be defined to include not only
grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their protocols, but also violations of the rules applicable in non-international armed conflict, e.g., civil wars and other internal conflicts,
that are specified in common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions.' 3 6
[W]e believe that the [war crimes] provision should also cover
violations of the rules of non-international armed conflicts, e.g.,
civil wars, rebellions, that137are specified in common Article 3 of
the Geneva conventions.
C. Crimes Against Humanity
Crimes against humanity, it is generally accepted, also should
be included within the ICC's subject matter jurisdiction. The
Nuremberg Charter defined crimes against humanity broadly to
include "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and
other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population or
persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds in execution of
or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal[.]" The phrase "committed against any civilian population" in
the Nuremberg Charter has been interpreted to require that the
135. Prosecutor v. Tadi6, supra note 51, 134.
136. Letter from Barbara Larkin, Acting Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs to Hon.
Lamar Smith, Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, Committee on the

Judiciary, House of Representatives, dated May 17, 1996, in H.R. Rep. No. 104-698, 104th
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1996), reprinted in, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2166, 2179 (hereinafter "House
Report on War Crimes Act of 1996").
137. Letter from Judith Miller, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, to Hon.
Bill McColum, Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime, House Committee, dated May 22, 1996,

in House Report on War Crimes Act of 1996, supra note 136, at 2178.
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acts must be "widespread or systematic" to constitute crimes
against humanity. As the International Law Commission stated:
0

[T]he definition of crimes against humanity encompasses inhumane acts of a very serious character involving widespread or
systematic violations aimed at the civilian population in whole or
in part. The hallmarks of such crimes lie in their large-scale and
systematic nature... [ The acts must be] committed as part of a
widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population
on
138
national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds.
A principal controversy regarding crimes against humanity is
whether crimes against humanity must be committed in connection
with an armed conflict, as was required in the Nuremberg Charter.
The Statute for the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia likewise
1 39
requires that such acts be "committed in an armed conflict."'
In our view, the armed conflict requirement should not be
included in the definition of crimes against humanity. As was
argued in the Preparatory Committee, "the armed conflict nexus
that appeared in the Nuremberg Tribunal Charter was no longer
required under existing law.' 1 40 The International Tribunal foi
Rwanda's statute, in contrast, does not require an "armed conflict"
14
requirement. 1
The Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia convincingly addressed this issue in a preliminary ruling in
the Tadi6 case and rejected an armed conflict nexus for crimes
against humanity. The Tribunal held that "[i]t is by now a settled
rule of customary international law that crimes against humanity do
not require a connection to international armed conflict. Indeed, as
the Prosecutor points out, customary international law may not
require a connection between crimes against humanity and any conflict at all.' ' 42
138. International Law Commission Commentary, supra note 11, 14. The Draft Code of
Crimes similarly provides that a crime against humanity involves acts "committed in a
systematic manner or on a large scale." Draft Code of Crimes, supra note 17, art. 18.
139. Statute for the Yugoslavia Tribunal, supra note 7, art. 5.
140. Preparatory Committee Report, supra note 33, 89.
141. Statute for the Rwanda Tribunal, supra note 55, art. 3.

142. Prosecutor v. Tadi6, supra note 48,

141.

1999]

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

D. Aggression

Aggression, as one of the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community, is included in the Draft Statute to create a
deterrent and avoid impunity for individuals responsible for committing aggression. 43 Aggression also was a focus of the Nuremberg Tribunal, and therefore, it is argued, omitting aggression from
the ICC's jurisdiction might be considered "retrogressive."'"
Nevertheless, many delegations argued in the Preparatory
Committee against including aggression for several reasons. First,
aggression has not yet been the subject of a multilateral treaty,
which would appear to conflict with the International Law Commission's view that the ICC's jurisdiction should be "defined by
existing treaties."' 4 Second, no commonly accepted definition of
aggression exists, and it is far from clear that additional effort will
yield results. Most definitions of aggression, such as General
Assembly Resolution 3314,146 refer to aggression by states and do
not contemplate individual criminal responsibility. This point is
buttressed by the fact that since Nuremberg there has not been significant national prosecutions of individuals for the crime of aggression, while there has been prosecutions by states for the core
crimes.
Third, because the Security Council has primary responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and security under the
UN Charter, the Security Council is required to make a determination "that a State has committed the act of aggression which is the
subject of the complaint."147 The necessity of Security Council
involvement, however, is problematic. The independence and
integrity of the ICC may be compromised if prosecutions for
aggression are dependent on a factual finding by a political institu143. The Draft Code of Crimes includes the "crime of aggression" as a crime against the
peace and security of mankind. Draft Code of Crimes, supra note 17, art. 16.
144. International Law Commission Commentary, supra note 11, art. 20; Preparatory

Committee Report, supra note 33, 66.
145. International Law Commission Commentary, supra note 11, art. 20.
146. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX) (Dec. 14,1974). See also Report of the Special Committee on
the Question of Defining Aggression, 24 August-21 September 1953, U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess.,
Supp. No. 11, U.N. Doc. A/2638 (1954).

147. Draft Statute, supra note 9, art. 23(2).
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tion such as the Security Council.'4 8 For these reasons, therefore,
we conclude that aggression should not be within the ICC's initial
subject matter jurisdiction.
E. Treaty-based Crimes
In addition to the crimes referred to by the ILC as "crimes
under general international law," the Draft Statute includes fourteen "treaty-based crimes," listed supra note 125, which relate to
terrorism, drug trafficking, apartheid and hostage-taking. The
ILC's criteria for inclusion of a particular treaty are (1) the crime
must be "defined by the treaty" with sufficient precision and (2)
the treaty must either "create[ ] a system of universal jurisdiction"
or permit trial of the crime by an international criminal court.1 49

Six of the fourteen treaties are "specifically concerned with terrorist offenses of one kind or another,"'' 0 and much of the debate
over inclusion of the treaty crimes has focused on terrorism.
Among the arguments advanced during the Preparatory Committee
for the inclusion of terrorism within the ICC's jurisdiction were
that: (1) terrorism is one of the most serious crimes of concern to
the international community; (2) recent Security Council practice
demonstrates the serious threat to international peace and security
from terrorism; (3) the ICC should be permitted to accept exceptionally serious cases of terrorism when referred by the Security
Council; and (4) international terrorism cases are precisely the
types of matters in which national tribunals may be unavailable or
ineffective. 151
The arguments raised in the Preparatory Committee against
including the treaty crimes, however, have garnered significant support. No generally accepted definition of terrorism exists, and
reaching agreement on a definition may delay the creation of the
ICC. Terrorism is investigated and prosecuted by national authorities. As the ILC notes with respect to the treaty-based crimes in
general, "many of those treaties could cover conduct which, though
148. See ICJ Position Paper, supra note 40, at 14; Lawyers Committee for Human Rights,
Establishing an International Criminal Court: Major Unresolved Issues in the Draft Statute

11 (Mar. 1996).
149. International Law Commission Commentary, supra note 11, art. 20.
150. Id at art. 20.
151. Preparatory Committee Report, supra note 33, 106.
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serious in itself, was within the competence of national courts to

deal with and did not
require elevation to the level of an interna152

tional jurisdiction.,

Concerns also arose at the Preparatory Committee meetings
that broadening the ICC's jurisdiction to include the treaty crimes
would overburden the ICC's limited resources while detracting
from the prosecution of other core crimes, or perhaps trivialize the
ICC's role and functions. 153 Finally, the treaty crimes "could lessen
the resolve of States to conduct national investigations and prosecutions and politicize the functions of the Court.' 1 54 We, therefore,

conclude that the treaty-based crimes should be excluded for the
time being from the ICC's subject matter jurisdiction.
F. Conclusion
The ICC's subject matter jurisdiction, at least initially, should
encompass only the three "core crimes" - genocide, serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflict, and
crimes against humanity. A number of factors compel this conclusion. Most important is the fact that the three core crimes are the
only crimes which a considerable majority of countries clearly consider to be part of customary international law.
In addition, under the guiding principle of complementarity, as
set forth in the Preamble to the Draft Statute, the ICC should only
prosecute cases "where such trial procedures may not be available
or may be ineffective."' 55 A narrower subject matter jurisdiction of
the core international crimes, therefore, may enhance complementarity by minimizing the potential for overlap or direct conflict
between the ICC and national courts. Narrowing the jurisdiction of
the ICC may also facilitate broader acceptance, as well as simplify
the functioning of the court.' 56 Furthermore, the elements of these
152. International Law Commission Commentary, supra note 11, art. 20.
153. Preparatory Committee Report, supranote 33, 116. The United States opposes the

inclusion of terrorism and drug trafficking within the ICC's jurisdiction. Statement of The
Honorable Conrad K. Harper, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, USUN Press Rel. No. 149-

(94), at 2 (Oct. 25, 1994) (hereinafter "Statement of Conrad K. Harper").
154. Preparatory Committee Report, supra note 33, 107.
155. Draft Statute, supra note 9, Preamble.

156. Preparatory Committee Report, supra note 33, at

107. See also International Law

Commission Commentary, supra note 11, art. 20 (noting that inclusion of three core crimes

was influenced by statute of International Tribunal for Yugoslavia).
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crimes, including defenses, must be enumerated in the Statute itself
so that the conduct proscribed is precisely defined.
Nevertheless, the crime of terrorism clearly is of significant
concern to the international community and therefore, in principle,
may be appropriate for the ICC's subject matter jurisdiction. Thus,
given that the development of customary international law is a fluid
process, a review mechanism should be included that would allow
the initial subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC to be expanded at a
later time. 57

V. THE EXERCISE
A.

OF JURISDICTrON BY THE ICC

State consent requirements and "inherentjurisdiction"

An investigation of a crime within the ICC's jurisdiction may
be initiated either by a state party or by the Security Council.
Using the terminology
of the Draft Statute, the Security Council
"refer[s] a matter,' 5 while "a complaint is brought"' 59 by a state.
When proceedings are initiated by state complaint, the ICC's
assumption of jurisdiction over an accused is dependent on numerous state consent requirements (the consent requirements are dispensed with when the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII
of the Charter, refers a matter to the court 60 ). Consent is given,
under the Draft Statute's "opt-in" approach, when a state that has
ratified ICC statute lodges declarations specifying the crimes over
which the state accepts the jurisdiction of the ICC.' 6 ' (The exception is genocide, where the Court has "inherent jurisdiction," as
described below.) Such declarations may be general, or may contain temporal limitations, or may be limited to a single incident or
crisis. 162

157. Preparatory Committee Report, supra note 33,
establishing a review procedure).

115 (noting differing views on

158. Draft Statute, supra note 9, art. 23(1).
159. Id. at arts. 25(3), 21(1)(a). The state complaint should "specify the circumstances of
the alleged crime and the identity and whereabouts of any suspect, and be accompanied by
such supporting documentation as is available[. ]"
160. International Law Commission Commentary, supra note 11, art. 23 ("referral" process
"allows the Security Council to initiate recourse to the Court by dispensing with the
requirement of the acceptance by a State of the Court's jurisdiction").
161. Draft Statute, supra note 9, art. 22(1).
162. Id. at art. 22(2), (3).

1999]

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

The consent requirements affect: (1) the initiation of investigations, (2) the ICC's exercise of jurisdiction and (3) the procedures
for transferring accused persons to the Court. First, a state cannot
bring a complaint alleging that a particular crime, other than genocide, has been committed unless that state has lodged a declaration
accepting the ICC's jurisdiction over such crime. 163 With respect to

as long as the state is a party
genocide, a declaration is not 1required
64
to the Genocide Convention.
Second, in order for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over a suspect, the jurisdiction of the ICC over the crime alleged must be
accepted by: (1) the state with custody over the accused and (2) the
state in which the crime is alleged to have occurred. 65 When the
complaint alleges genocide there are no state consent requirements
because the Genocide Convention provides for trial by an "international penal tribunal,"'1 6 6 which is interpreted to allow for the exercise of the ICC's "inherent jurisdiction."
Third, the transference of persons to the Court, pursuant to a
request from the Registrar to a state, may also involve consent
requirements. For example, if a state with custody of an accused
receives an extradition request pursuant to an extradition treaty
from another state, the acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction by the
state with a right of extradition is required. 67 In other cases the
duty to transfer an accused depends on the crime and whether the
state has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court over the crime. In
the case of genocide and crimes which a state has lodged a declaration accepting jurisdiction, a state party receiving a request "shall
take immediate steps to arrest and transfer the accused to the
Court.' 1 68 States that are not parties to the ICC statute may cooperate with the ICC upon receipt of a request to arrest and transfer
an accused to the ICC, although a binding obligation is not
imposed. 6 9

163. Id. at art. 25(2).
164. Id at art. 25(1).
165. Id. at art. 21(1)(b).
166. Genocide Convention, supra note 65, art. 4.
167. Draft Statute, supra note 9, art. 21(2).

168. Id. at art. 53(2).
169. Id. at arts. 53(1), 56.
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B. Trigger mechanism and the role of the Security Council
1. How should an investigation be triggered?
The right to trigger an investigation is limited to the Security
Council and to state parties to the ICC statute. The Preparatory
Committee considered proposals to authorize the Prosecutor or
individuals, in addition to states and the Security Council, to trigger
investigations. Proposals to permit investigations to be triggered by
the Prosecutor and/or by individuals found support among some
countries and non-governmental organizations which argued that
the purposes and ideals of the ICC cannot be realized unless the
Prosecutor and individuals are permitted to initiate proceedings.
States and the Security Council, it is argued, will in many cases be
unwilling to file complaints for political or other reasons.
Other delegations argued against an independent power of the
Prosecutor to institute proceedings on the grounds that such
authorization could politicize the ICC, undermine its credibility and
strain the resources of the ICC, not least because a Prosecutor's
decision to investigate without a complaint or referral presumably
would require an additional layer of review.
2. The role of the Security Council
A key issue regarding the triggering of the ICC's jurisdiction
involves the role of the Security Council. Article 23(3) of the Draft
Statute provides:
No prosecution may be commenced under this Statute arising
from a situation which is being dealt with by the Security Council
as a threat to or breach of the peace or an act of aggression under
Chapter VII of the Charter, unless the Security Council decides
otherwise.
Article 23(3), strongly favored by the United States, is, as the
International Law Commission Commentary explains, "an
acknowledgment of the priority given by Article 12 of the Charter[170 ] as well as for the need for coordination between the [Inter170. The UN Charter affords the Security Council primary authority "relative to the
maintenance of international peace and security." U.N. CHARTER, art. 12. Chapter VII of
the Charter provides that the Security Council shall "decide what measures shall be taken...
to maintain or restore international peace and security." U.N. CHARTER, art. 39.
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national Criminal] Court and the Council in such cases." The ICC
must operate in conformity with the UN Charter, which permits the
Security Council to make measured judgments regarding the panoply of appropriate responses to a breach of the peace or act of
aggression. Prosecutions under international criminal law should
promote, not hinder, peace. Thus, it is argued, "the primary U.N.
body empowered to handle issues of international peace and security must not be handcuffed by the prosecutor investigating a partic71
ular suspect.'
Other delegations and many commentators, however, argue
that Article 23(3) is a threat to the independence of the ICC.
Despite the ILC's statement that Article 23(3) "does not give the
Council a mere 'negative veto' over the commencement of prosecutions, 1 7 2 the Security Council retains the option of exercising its
Chapter VII powers and blocking any prosecution. As a result,
Article 23(3) is fundamentally incompatible with an independent
ICC. The Security Council, as an overtly political body, should not
have the ability to prevent the exercise of the ICC's jurisdiction
over a particular situation. The problem is compounded by the
vagueness of the phrase "being dealt with by the Security Council,"
which could be interpreted to simply mean the placement of an
item on the Security Council's agenda.1 73
An alternative proposal seeks to resolve the ambiguity of the
phrase "being dealt with" by restricting the circumstances in which
an ICC prosecution may be blocked while accommodating the role
of the Security Council. These proposals seek to narrow the Security Council's ability to prevent the initiation of prosecutions by, for
example, requiring the Security Council to make a formal decision
to request the court not to proceed, or by permitting a delay in

171. United States Delegation to Preparatory Committee on ICC, "Trigger Mechanism,"
Second Question, The Role of the Security Council and of Complaints by States, Articles 23

and 25 (Apr. 1996). See also David Scheffer, InternationalJudicialIntervention, 102 FOREIGN
POL'Y 32, 50 (1996).

172. International Law Commission Commentary, supra note 11, Art. 23.
173. Preparatory Committee Report, supra note 33, 142. See also Lawyers Committee
for Human Rights, supra note 148, at 10 (arguing that Article 23(3) unnecessarily permits a
political body, the Security Council, to control the ICC's ability to act).
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prosecution by the ICC in "a situation in respect of which Chapter
VII action is actually being taken" by the Security Council. 174
C. Conclusions
The Draft Statute's state consent requirements are intended to
maximize state participation and cooperation with the ICC. This is,
of course, a compelling purpose, especially because the Yugoslavia
and Rwanda Tribunals clearly have suffered from a lack of state
cooperation. A state which ratifies the ICC treaty, however, and
follows through with its obligation to pass implementing legislation, 175 should not be required to take further steps to indicate
acceptance of the ICC's limited jurisdiction. The statute should
provide that state parties to the ICC statute automatically
accept
17 6
the Court's inherent jurisdiction over the core crimes.
Moreover, as some members of the ILC have argued, "the
strict requirements of acceptance contained in Article 21 [are]
likely to frustrate its operation in many cases, and even to make the
quest for international criminal jurisdiction nugatory.'1 77 As others
have noted, "[t]hese obviously complicated consent requirements
could lead to absurd situations.' 7 For example, a state with custody of a person accused of committing war crimes in another state
would be prevented from transferring the person to the ICC without the consent of the state on whose territory the crime was committed. We conclude, therefore, that the Draft Statute's state
consent requirements would weaken the ICC's effectiveness, and
should be simplified or eliminated.
A preferable option would be to allow any state party to lodge
a complaint regarding any of the core crimes within the ICC's jurisdiction. Under this approach, states would be considered to have
consented to the jurisdiction of the ICC over all of the core crimes
by signing and ratifying the ICC Statute. The exercise of "inherent
174. Preparatory Committee Report, supra note 33,
143; Preparatory Committee
Compilation of Proposals, supranote 35, art. 23; Working Paper Submitted by France, supra
note 82, art. 38(3).
175. The ICC statute will likely have a provision similar to that found in Security Council

resolution 827, which stipulated that all states "shall take any measures necessary under their
domestic law to implement the provisions" of the statute. S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993).
176. Preparatory Committee Compilation of Proposals, supra note 35, art. 22.
177. International Law Commission Commentary, supra note 11, Part 3.
178. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, supra note 148, at 16.
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jurisdiction" over the core crimes is appropriate because these
crimes are clearly established under customary international law.
The distinction between genocide and the other core crimes for the
purposes of determining the ICC's jurisdiction is unnecessary.
We believe that the effectiveness of the ICC will be greatly
enhanced if the Prosecutor, in addition to state parties and the
Security Council, is permitted to initiate proceedings in the absence
of a state complaint or Security Council referral, with appropriate
judicial review. One proposal for such review requires that complaints initiated by the Prosecutor be reviewed in camera by an
"indictment chamber" composed of judges who would not ultimately try the case. The procedure by the indictment chamber
"upon a hearing, would decide whether the matter-should be pursued by the Prosecutor or the case should be dropped."' 79
Whether complaints are initiated by the Prosecutor or by
states, however, the gatekeeper function of the Security Council
under Article 23(3) remains problematic. Whether or not the
Security Council's role is characterized as a "veto" should not
obscure the potential of Article 3(3) to significantly diminish the
Court's independence. Of course, the Security Council's role as a
peacemaker and peace enforcer under the UN Charter should be
recognized and encouraged. The danger of abuse exists, though, if
Article 23(3) is used to prevent the ICC from pursuing prosecutions
for overtly political reasons.
It is also doubtful whether adequate compromise language
could be formulated to reduce the discretion of the Security Council. No matter how Article 23(3) is phrased, if prosecutions are perceived as requiring the imprimatur of the Security Council, then
many countries appropriately will question the legitimacy and effectiveness of the ICC. Article 23(3) in its present form, therefore,
should be eliminated in order to ensure the independence and
integrity of the ICC.
Finally, concerns that the Court would exercise unfettered discretion to initiate prosecutions, in the absence of the state consent
requirements or Security Council oversight, are vastly overstated.
The Draft Statute contains a number of procedural safeguards. For
example, the Prosecutor and the Presidency are required to deter179. Preparatory Committee Compilation of Proposals, supra note 35, art. 22.
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mine whether a prima facie case exists and whether the case is
"admissible" under Article 35, that is, whether national authorities
may prosecute or whether the case "is
not of such gravity to justify
further action by the Court."' 80 An accused or any "interested
State" also is authorized to mount challenges to the jurisdiction of
the Court after the confirmation of the indictment.' 8 And any
"interested State," or the Court itself, is authorized to make a
motion regarding Rule 35 admissibility. Finally, even in the
absence of a challenge, each organ of the Court has a responsibility
to satisfy itself that jurisdiction is appropriately exercised in a given
case.

1 82

VI.

PROTECrION OF THE RIGHTS OF DEFENDANTS

The Draft Statute, and all proceedings before the ICC, must be
in accordance with the highest international standards of fairness
and due process. In general, the Draft Statute, which was expressly
modeled on Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 183 describes a workable level of protection of the
rights of accused persons. The Draft Statute, however, should also
make clear that the listing of certain rights under existing customary
law is not intended to exclude others, thus leaving room for the
incorporation of additional rights that may be recognized in the
180. Draft Statute, supra note 9, arts. 27, 35.
181. 1& at art. 34.
182. Draft Statute supra note 9, art. 24; International Law Commentary, supra note 11, art.
24.
183. Article 41 of the Draft Statute "reflects as closely as possible the fundamental rights of
the accused set forth in article 14 of the ICCPR." International Law Commission
Commentary, supra note 11, art. 41. In addition, the Draft Statute guarantees a suspect's
right "to remain silent, without such silence being a consideration in the determination of
guilt or innocence" and "to have the assistance of counsel of the suspect's choice or... to
have legal assistance assigned by the Court." Draft Statute, supra note 9, art. 2 6(6)(a).
Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil Political Rights sets forth an array of
rights of accused persons, defendants and convicted persons. These rights include the right to
be informed promptly of the charges; the right to communicate with counsel of his or her
choosing; the right to adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense; the right to be tried
without undue delay; the right, in general, to be present at trial; the right to legal assistance,
including the right to appointed counsel; if the accused is unable to pay for counsel the right
to examine the witnesses against him or her; the right to obtain the attendance of defense
witnesses; the right to translation of document and proceedings; the right not to be compelled
to testify or confess guilt; the right to appeal; and the right to a pardon or reversal based on
newly discovered facts showing a miscarriage of justice. International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 UNTS 171, art. 14.
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future.'" Specific areas of concern regarding the rights of the
accused are addressed below.
The Draft Statute provides an Indictment Chamber "[i]n cases
where a trial cannot be held because of the deliberate absence of an
accused."' 8 5 The Indictment Chamber procedures, modeled on rule
61 of the Rules of Evidence and Procedure of the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia, allow the Prosecutor to publicly present the
evidence that has been gathered against the accused, and to have
that evidence recorded and preserved. According to the ILC, the
Indictment Chamber is intended to "fulfill some of the purposes of
a trial in absentia," by, inter alia, "mak[ing] the accused in a certain
sense a fugitive from international justice while still giving the
accused an opportunity to defend against the charges if eventually
brought before the court."
As demonstrated in the rule 61 proceedings conducted by the
Yugoslavia Tribunal, 8 6 the Indictment Chamber may well serve a
vital function. Cause for concern exists, however, with respect to
provision that "the record of evidence before the Indictment Chamber shall be admissible"' 8 7 at any subsequent trial of the accused.
This provision may be inconsistent with the defendant's fundamental right to "examine, or have examined, the prosecution witnesses"
recognized in Article 41(a)(3) of the Statute. There is also the possibility that testimony of unnamed witnesses in the Indictment
Chamber proceedings could be introduced at trial.'8 8
There is no reason why evidence introduced at an Indictment
Chamber proceeding should be "admissible" merely because it was
presented by the Chamber. As was noted in the Preparatory Committee, at the very least the "accused should be able to challenge
the admissibility of the evidence recorded in his or her absence."' 89
Thus, the Indictment Chamber record should not be automatically
admissible in a subsequent trial.
184. See generally Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Fairness to Defendants at the
International Criminal Court: Proposals to Strengthen the Draft Statute (Aug. 1996).

185. Draft Statute, supra note 9, art. 37(4).
186. Third Report of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, supra note 50,

50-61.

187. Draft Statute, supra note 9, art. 37(5).
188. See Monroe Leigh, The Yugoslav Tribunal: Use of Unnamed Witnesses Against
Accused, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 235, 238 (1996) (arguing that ruling of Yugoslavia Tribunal trial
chamber allowing prosecutor to withhold from accused the identity of some witnesses harms

prospect for permanent international criminal court).
189. Preparatory Committee Report, supra note 33,

259.
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The Draft Statute states "as a general rule, the accused should
be present during the trial."' 9 ° Exceptions from this general rule

permit the Trial Chamber to order trials in absentia (1) for reasons
of security or ill health of the accused, (2) where the accused has
escaped from lawful custody; or (3) where the accused is continuing
to disrupt the trial. This range of circumstances is vague and overbroad, however, and may permit trials in absentia in circumstances
where the procedure may be unwarranted. For example, it is
doubtful that considerations regarding "ill health" of a defendant or
"security" should merit a trial in absentia. In our view, the more
general prohibition of trials in absentia included in the Statute of
the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia should be adopted.191
The Draft Statute also authorizes the "provisional arrest" of a
suspect before formal charges are brought, upon a finding that
there is "probable cause" to believe that the suspect has committed
a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC, and that the suspect
"may not be available to stand trial" if not provisionally arrested.
The provisions pertaining to provisional arrest, however, require
further clarification. For example, the Draft Statute appears to permit an indefinite term of detention by allowing detention longer
than ninety days "as the Presidency may allow."'" In addition, it is
not clear that provisionally arrested suspects have a right to prompt
access to a lawyer or the capacity to challenge the detention. Suspects provisionally arrested should be expressly afforded all the
procedural protections and rights granted arrested persons.
VII.

Ti

UNITED STATES AND T=E INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT

A permanent international criminal court deserves the strong
support of the United States government. An independent ICC is
consistent with prior positions and policies of the United States
executive, legislative, and judicial branches and would further long190. Draft Statute, supra note 9, 37(1).
191. The Statute for the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia makes no provision for trials
in absentia. The Secretary-General's Report states that "[t]here is a widespread perception
that trials in absentiashould not be provided for in the statute as this would not be consistent
with Article 14 of the International Covenant Civil and Political Rights, which provides that
the accused shall be entitled to be tried in his presence." Secretary-General's Yugoslavia

Tribunal Report, supra note 7,

101.

192. Draft Statute, supra note 9, art.28(2).

1999]

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

established and bipartisan goals. This section, then, presents the
proposed international criminal court in the context of United
States policy and principles, and concludes that active promotion of
an independent ICC should be a primary goal of the United States
government.
The prosecution of war criminals has long been a principal
objective of American policy. The United States spearheaded the
creation of the Nuremberg, Tokyo, Yugoslavia, and Rwanda tribunals.193 In these fora the United States has consistently and forcefully argued in favor of individual criminal responsibility for
perpetrators of crimes under international law. As a senior State
Department official testified recently before Congress, "those
accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide must
must be tried and, if found guilty, they
be brought to justice. They 194
accountable.
held
be
must
With respect to the ICC proposal, the United States position
has evolved from indifference to qualified support. 19 5 This support

finds expression in a high level of participation in the Preparatory
Committee and, in 1995, the Ad Hoc Committee. 196 The United

States delegation has circulated detailed position papers, and has
played an important role in defining the debate. The ILC's Draft
Statute, in fact, incorporates many suggestions made by the United
States.97 President Clinton, moreover, expressed support for a

permanent ICC in a speech delivered in October 1995:
By successfully prosecuting war criminals in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, we can send a strong signal to those who would
use the cover of war to commit terrible atrocities that they cannot escape the consequences of such actions. And a signal will
come across even more loudly and clearly if nations all around
193. See also Scheffer, supra note 171, at 47-48 (describing American initiatives regarding

Iraq and Cambodia genocide prosecutions).
194. Statement of Michael J. Matheson, Principal Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of
State, before the House Committee on the Judiciary (June 12, 1996) (available on NEXIS

Federal News Service file).
195. See Scheffer, supra note 171, at 49 ("From the Clinton administration's earliest days,
the government established a far more positive approach to the concept of an international
criminal court than had the previous administration.").
196. In addition, in the early 1950s, the United States representative chaired both sessions
of the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction. 1951 Draft Statute, supra note 20,
4; 1953 Revised Draft Statute, supra note 22, 6.
197. Statement of Conrad K. Harper, supra note 153, at 2-3.
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the world who value freedom and tolerance establish a permanent international court to prosecute, with the support of the
United Nations Security Council, serious violations of humanitarian law. This, it seems to me, would be the ultimate tribute to
the people who did such important work at Nuremberg, a permanent international court to prosecute such violations. And we
are working today at the United Nations to see whether it can be
done. 198

The United States recognizes the law to be applied by the ICC
to be part of binding customary international law.' 99 The federal
courts, moreover, have shown awareness of the content and scope
of international humanitarian law.2 0° And as the United States government argued before the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia:
The relevant law and precedents for the offenses in question here
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity - clearly
contemplate international as well as national action against the
individuals responsible. Proscription of these crimes has long
since acquired thestatus of customary international law, binding
on all states, and such crimes have already been the subject of
international prosecutions by the Nuremberg and Tokyo
Tribunals. 20 '

The United States Congress also has demonstrated knowledge
of the utility and feasibility of an international criminal tribunal.
Since 1993, Congress has consistently voted significant funding, as
well as contributions of personnel and resources, in support of the
establishment and operations of the International Tribunals for
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The bipartisan support for these contributions by the United States demonstrates that international criminal
198. 31 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1840 (Oct. 15, 1995). See also Letter from Jamison S.
Borek, Deputy Legal Adviser, United States Department of State to Barbara Paul Robinson,
President of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, dated April 15, 1996
(invoking President Clinton's remarks and stating that "[tihe United States is pursuing a
policy consistent with the views of the President"); Statement of Conrad K. Harper, supra
note 153, at 2 ("the most compelling case for a permanent court is made with respect to war
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide").
199. See House Report on War Crimes Act of 1996, supra note 136, at 2177-80 (views of
Department of State and Department of Defense on War Crimes Act of 1996).
200. See e.g., Kadic, 70 F.3d at 242-43.
201. Amicus Curiae Brief of the United States of America in Prosecutor v. Tadi6, (Case
No. IT-94-I-T) at 20 (25 July 1995) (quoted in ICI Position Paper, supra note 40, at § 5A).
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law enforcement is a priority of Congress, 2°2 as well as of the Executive branch.
Numerous statutes also have expressly referred to the need for
some type of international criminal court. In 1986, the Omnibus
Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act requested the President

to explore an international tribunal for prosecuting terrorists. °3
The 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act called for an international criminal
court with jurisdiction over international drug trafficking and
"international crimes." 20 4 In 1991, Congress passed an appropriations bill expressing its sense that "the United States should
explore the need for the establishment of an International Criminal
Court.

,2 o5

202. Congressional support for international criminal tribunals is also shown through the
recent enactment of legislation providing judicial assistance to the International Tribunals for
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. This law extends the provisions of U.S. law regarding the
extradition of persons to a foreign country to "the surrender of persons, including United
States citizens" to the International Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda. National Defense
Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 1342, 110 Stat. 486 (1996).
203. Section 1201(d) of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Terrorism Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-399, 100 Stat. 896, entitled "Consideration of an International Tribunal," states that
"[t]he President should also consider . . . the possibility of eventually establishing an
international tribunal for prosecuting terrorists."
204. Section 4108 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 provided:
(a) In General. - It is the sense of the Senate that the President should begin
discussions with foreign governments to investigate the feasibility and advisability
of establishing an international criminal court to expedite cases regarding the
prosecution of persons accused of having engaged in international drug trafficking
or having committed international crimes.
(b) United States Citizens. - Such discussions shall not include any commitment
that such court shall have jurisdiction over the extradition of United States citizens
and shall assure that any international agreement shall recognize the rights and
privileges guaranteed to United States citizens under the United States
Constitution. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4267,
§ 4108 (1988).
205. The Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations
Act, 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-513, 104 Stat. 2067, § 599E (Nov. 5, 1990) provided as follows:
(a) The Congress finds that(1) the international community has defined as criminal conduct in various
international conventions, certain acts such as war crimes, crimes against
humanity, torture, piracy and crimes on board commercial vessels, aircraft
hijacking, and sabotage of aircraft, crimes against diplomats and other
internationally protected persons, hostage-taking, and illicit drug cultivation
and trafficking;
(2) in spite of these international conventions, the effective prosecution of
those who commit criminal acts has been seriously obstructed in certain cases
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In January 1993 Senator Christopher Dodd introduced a Congressional joint resolution stating that the United States should
"make every effort to advance this [ICC] proposal at the United
Nations." 6 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the joint resolution and on the international criminal court
in May 1993. The Committee subsequently issued a report recommending the adoption of the joint resolution placing the Congress
on record in support of the concept of an ICC.207
because of problems of extradition and differences between the legal and
judicial systems of individual nations;
(3) the jurisdiction of The International Court of Justice extends only to cases
involving governments, and not to individual criminal cases;
(4) the concept of an international criminal court has been under consideration
in the United Nations and other international forums for many years, including
proposals and reviews undertaken in 1990 by the United Nations General
Assembly, the International Law Commission, and the Eighth United Nations
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders;
(5) the international military tribunals established in Nuremberg, Germany,
and Tokyo, Japan, following World War II also establish a precedent for
international criminal tribunals; and
(6) there is a growing movement among nations of the world to formulate their
economic, political and legal systems on a multilateral basis.
(b) It is the sense of Congress that(1) the United States should explore the need for the establishment of an
International Criminal Court on a universal or regional basis to assist the
international community in dealing more effectively with criminal acts defined
in international conventions; and
(2) the establishment of such a court or courts for the more effective
prosecution of international criminals should not derogate from established
standards of due process, the rights of the accused to a fair trial and the
sovereignty of individual nations.
(c) The President shall report to the Congress by October 1, 1991, the results of his
efforts in regard to the establishment of an International Criminal Court to deal
with criminal acts defined in international conventions.
(d) The Judicial Conference of the United States shall report to the Congress by
October 1, 1991, on the feasibility of, and relationship to, the Federal judiciary
of an International Criminal Court.
206. Senate Report, supra note 14, § 2 (SJ. Res. 32).
207. The Resolution provided that: "It is the sense of Congress that (1) the establishment
of an international criminal court with jurisdiction over crimes of an international character
would greatly strengthen the international rule of law; (2) such a court would thereby serve
the interests of the United States and the world community; and (3 the United States
delegation should make every effort to advance this proposal at the United Nations." Senate
Report, supra note 14, § 2 (S.J. Res. 32)..
The 1993 hearings also revealed opposition to the proposed ICC. For example, Senator
Helms, the present Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, described the ICC
initiative as "an unwise and dangerous proposal" and stated that "I will resist, to the best of
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More recently, the President signed into law the War Crimes
Act of 1996, designed to carry out the obligations of the United
States under the 1949 Geneva Conventions to provide criminal penalties for certain war crimes. The House Report stated that war
crimes "[p]rosecutions can be handled by the nations involved or
by an internationaltribunal"' 0
In our view, moreover, the United States Constitution does not
present a barrier to participation in the ICC.20 9 First, Congress has
authority to ratify United States participation in the ICC under Art.
I, Sec. 8 of the Constitution, which provides that "The Congress
shall have Power To define and punish offenses against the Law of
Nations." In Yamashita, the Supreme Court relied on Art. I, Sec. 8
to uphold Congressional authority to determine "an appropriate tribunal for the trial and punishment of offenses against the law of
war." 10 The House Report for the War Crimes Act of 1996 cited
Yamashita as authority for its unequivocal conclusion that "[tihe
constitutional authority to enact federal criminal laws relating to
the commission of war crimes is undoubtedly the same as the
authority to create military commissions to prosecute perpetrators
'
of these crimes."211
Second, the absence of certain constitutional protections, such
as a right to trial by jury, does not render United States participation in the ICC unconstitutional. The ICC would not be a tribunal
my ability, this notion of a permanent international criminal court." Senate Report, supra
note 14, § 3.
208. House Report on War Crimes Act of 1996, supra note 136, at 2173 (emphasis added).
See also Statement of Mark S. Zaid, Esq., before the House Judiciary Committee

Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims on H.R. 2587.(June 12, 1996) (available on
NEXIS, Federal News Service file).
209. See Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution 270 (2d ed.

1996) ("If the proposed International Criminal Court came into existence and the United
States adhered to it, United States participation would not be constitutionally
troublesome."); Paul D. Marquardt, Law Without Borders: The Constitutionality of an
International Criminal Court, 1 COLUM I. TRANSNAT'L L. 73, 73 (1995) (arguing that
"Constitutional objections [to the ICC] are simply poorly reasoned"). But see Report of the
Judicial Conference of the United States on the Feasibility of and the Relationship to the
Federal Judiciary of an International Criminal Court (Sept. 1991), in Senate Report., supra
note 14, § 3 (questioning "whether the United States could participate in an International
Criminal Court, or permit its citizens to be tried in such a court, that did not adhere to the

full range of protections provided to defendants by the U.S. Constitution as interpreted by
U.S. Courts.").
210. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 7 (1946).
211. House Report on War Crimes Act of 1996, supra note 136, at 2172.
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of the United States exercising "the judicial power of the United
States '2 12 under Article 111.213 The ICC would be an international
tribunal, established by multilateral treaty, and there is no constitutional requirement that the full panoply of constitutional protections applicable to Article HI tribunals must apply ipso facto to
proceedings before the ICC. Indeed, under the "rule of noninquiry," U.S. courts routinely approve extradition of persons to
foreign countries without consideration of the adequacy or integrity of the judicial procedures in the requesting state.214
Finally, it is constitutionally permissible for the United States
to waive the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over a defendant in
favor of the ICC. As the U.S. Supreme Court has stated, "a sovereign nation has exclusive jurisdiction to punish offenses within its
borders, unless it expressly or impliedly consents to surrender its
2 15

jurisdiction.

VIII.

CONCLUSION

Significant progress has been made in the past several years
toward the establishment of a permanent international criminal
court. Nevertheless, the ultimate success of the ICC depends on
whether the political will is present to resolve such divisive issues as
the ICC's jurisdiction and the role of the Security Council. Another
looming roadblock that will test governmental resolve to create the
ICC relates to the financing of the Court. The Draft Statute does
not state how the Court will be financed, but the basic choices are
to fund the ICC through the regular budget of the UN, or establish
a separate assessment. 6 These questions must await final resolution at the diplomatic conference scheduled for late 1998.
Once established, the effectiveness of the ICC will depend on
the seriousness with which countries take their duties under the
212. Article III, section 1 of the US Constitution states that "The Judicial power of the
United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."

213. See Hirota v. MacArthur, 388 U.S. 197, 198 (1948) (denying habeas corpus writs
brought by Japanese citizens being held in custody by the Tokyo war crimes tribunal because
"the tribunal sentencing these petitioners is not a tribunal of the United States."; Henkin,
supra note 209, at 268.

214. E.g., Ahmed v. Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063, 1067 (2d. Cir. 1990).
215. Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957) (per curiam).

216. Preparatory Committee Report, supra note 33,

32.
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statute. The International Tribunal for Yugoslavia, despite its
achievements, has experienced tremendous frustrations as states
ignore promises of cooperation while indicted war criminals remain
free.2 17 For the ICC, it is apparent that the enormous efforts that
have sustained the drive toward the establishment of a permanent
Court must be maintained in order to guarantee that the ICC will
be a truly effective institution.
IX.

SUMiviARiY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

* The United States should work toward the prompt finalization
and ratification of the ICC treaty.
* The ICC's subject matter jurisdiction initially should be limited
to genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.
v The Draft Statute's state consent requirements, which determine whether the ICC's jurisdiction may be exercised, may
unnecessarily inhibit the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction
and should be modified.
* The Prosecutor should be permitted to initiate investigations,
in addition to state parties and the Security Council.
* The Security Council's primary role in the maintenance of
international peace and security should not include the power
to block the initiation of cases within the ICC's jurisdiction.
* The protections afforded accused persons and defendants
under internationally recognized standards of fairness and due
process must be recognized and enforced by the ICC.
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